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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LUCILLE JESSE MOFFAT
THORNOCK, et al,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

CASE NO. 16231

vs.

LOIS S. COOK,
Defendant and Appellant

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title to mineral rights in
certain real property located in Rich County, Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Rich County granted a Default
Certificate against all defendants except Appellant LOIS
S. COOK, who alone appeared and answered; granted Summary
Judgment for Plaintiffs upon Plaintiffs' Motion; and issued
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a Decree of Quiet Title confirming title to the dis;icc;:
mineral rights in plaintiffs.
and Decree, Defendant LOIS S.

From this Surnrnary Juc;v,;·
COOK appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment
below, and a remand to the District Court for a trial t:
jury on the merits.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant refers to and incorporates herein by
reference the Statement set forth in Appellant's Brief
on this Appeal.

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .

. .

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

2

ARGUMENT.

3

POINT I.

POINT II.

CONCLUSION

THE RECORD INDICATES A DEFECT IN
THORNOCK'S TITLE TO THE REAL
PROPERTY IN DISPUTE, AND SUCH
DEFECT MUST BE RESOLVED BEFORE
THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES HEREIN
CAN BE DETERMINED . . . . . . . .
A.

COOK HAS AN INTEREST IN THE
REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE
SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE HER TO
RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE
ALLEGED DEFECT . . . . .

B.

SHOULD THE COURT FIND A
DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S TITLE
TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE, COOK CAN ASSERT A
CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY BY
REASON OF ADVERSE POSSESS ION . . . . . • . . . . .

C.

SHOULD THE COURT FIND COOK'S
CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY BY
REASON OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
VALID, THORNOCK HAS NO RIGHT
TO THE MINERALS . . . . . . .

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT QUESTIONS
OF FACT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE
QUITCLAIM DEED EXIST WHICH WARRANT A TRIAL ON THE MERITS
14

................

17

i
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 226, 507 P. 2d
710 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . .
. ..

9

Durham v. Margetts, 517 P. 2d 1332 (Utah 1977)

15

McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind. 518, 82 N.E. 1057
(1907) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Peterson v. Weber County, 99 Utah 281, 103 P. 2d
(1940)). . . . . .
..... .
Phillips v. Johnson, 202 Okla. 645, 217 P. 2d
520 (1950) . • . . . . . . .
. ...
Walton v. Rosson, 216 Va. 732, 222 S.E. 2d 553
(1976) . . . . . . • . . . .
. . . .

8

10
7

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-13 (Repl. Vol. 6 A 1953).
Utah Code Ann. §57-6-4

13

(Repl. Vol. 6 A 1953).

8

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-8 (Repl. Vol. 9 A 1977).

6

Utah Code Ann. §78-12-10 (Repl. Vol. 9 A 1977).

6

OTHER AUTHORITIES
3

Am. Jur.

2d "Adverse Possession" §96.

6

23 Am. Jur. 2d "Deeds" §262

9

59 Am. Jur. 2d "Parties" §26

5

65 Am. Jur. 2d "Quieting Title" §45.

4

26 C.J.S. "Deeds" §118

12

ii

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE RECORD INDICATES A DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S TITLE
TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE, AND SUCH DEFECT MUST BE
RESOLVED BEFORE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES HEREIN CAN BE
DETERMINED.
A.

COOK HAS AN INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE SUFFICIENT TO ENABLE HER TO RAISE THE
ISSUE OF THE ALLEGED DEFECT.

B.

SHOULD THE COURT FIND A DEFECT IN THORNOCK'S
TITLE TO THE REAL PROPERTY IN DISPUTE, COOK
CAN ASSERT A CLAIM TO THE PROPERTY BY REASON
OF ADVERSE POSSESSION.

C.

SHOULD THE COURT FIND COOK'S CLAIM TO THE
PROPERTY BY REASON OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
VALID, THORNOCK HAS NO RIGHT TO THE
MINERALS.

Respondents in their Brief on Appeal (RB) for the
first time challenge the "standing" of COOK to raise the
defect in THORNOCK'S title.

(RB 15)

They set forth, with

authoritative support, the proposition that a defendant
in an action to quiet title cannot defeat plaintiff's
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title by showing a superior title in some third person
through whom the defendant makes no claim.
such proposition is irrelevant to the case.

Un f ortunatei;
Appellant

c:

is making no attempt to defeat defendant THORNOCK's tit'.;
by showing a superior title in some third person.

COOK

is merely raising the issue of the defect in THORNOCK's
title in order to demonstrate that COOK

herself, as a

remote grantee of THORNOCK, does not have title to the
property by deed, but rather has title to the property be
adverse possession.
Respondents correctly cite, but incorrectly apply,
the general rule stated at 65 Am. Jur. 2d "Quieting Tit:'
§45, in part:
In this regard, it has been said that the
court determines the rights of the parties
under the pleadings and evidence, grants
proper relief, and determines the better
title as between the parties to the proceeding, though a title superior to the
rights of either party may be held by a
stranger to the suit.
(emphasis added)
COOK is only concerned with proving that she has a
better title to the property than THORNOCK, not with
asserting that any stranger to the suit has a super~r
title.

The defect in Thornock' s title is only being

raised to prove the superiority of COOK's title.
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Further, Respondents claim that by asserting that
THORNOCK's title is defective, COOK defeats any claim
she has to the title through the chain of title and so
makes herself a stranger to the title with no "standing"
to assert the defect.

A person has standing to raise a

claim or defense whenever his or her rights or interests,
legal or equitable, are affected or threatened.

A person

must have
some real interest in the cause of action,
or a legal or equitable right, title, or
interest in the subject matter of the
controversy, sometimes spoken of as
standing.
59 Am. Jur. 2d "Parties" §26 at 374.
As discussed below, this issue is not a frivolous immaterial
matter to COOK.

The decision as to the defect in THORNOCK's

title will substantially affect her legal right and interest
in the property.

Clearly, the defect in THORNOCK's title is

an issue which COOK may and must raise.
As argued at Point I .B. of Appellant's Brief (AB

},

should the court find a defect in THORNOCK's title to the
real property in dispute, COOK can assert a claim to the
property by reason of adverse possession since she and her
late husband took possession of the property in 1952 and
occupied and used it for the statutory period.

Respondents

argue that there is no provision under Utah law for assertion
of adverse possession where the claimant has entered into

-5-
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possession without claim of title, and it is argued,
since COOK asserts she does not have title as a

remo~

grantee of THORNOCK, she entered into possession withou,
claim of title and therefore cannot adversely possess.
Respondents fall into the trap of failing to
distinguish between "claim of title" and "color of
title".

This distinction is at 3 Arn. Jur. 2d "Adverse

Possession" §96 at 177.
Terms such as 'claim of right', "claim of
ownership' .... mean nothing more than the
intention of the disseisor to appropriate
and use the land as his own to the exclusion of all others, irrespective of any
semblance or shadow of actual title or
right ........ .
'Color of title', on the other hand, is th~
which gives the semblance or appearance of
title, but is not title in fact--that which,
on its face, professes to pass title, but
fails to do so because of a want of title
in the person from whom it comes or the
employment of an ineffective means of
conveyance.
These differences between 'color' and
'claim' of title becomes important in
view of the fact that in order that a
possession may ripen into a title,
occupancy under a 'claim' of title or
right is indispensable, while 'color'
of title is not necessary, unless
required by statute.
As respondents note (RB 15), Utah law only requires
"claim of title", not " co 1 or o f t 1· tl e " .

Utah Code~
!>.~·

(Repl. Vol. 9 A 1977) §78-12-8 and §78-12-10.

-6-
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Claim of title can be demonstrated by conduct.

The

Virginia Supreme Court in Walton v. Rosson, 216 Va. 732,
222 S.E. 2d 553 (1976) set forth the criteria which the
majority of jurisdictions hold sufficient to establish
claim of title:
Claim of title, as opposed to color of
title, is a mere assertion of ownership
or right, without paper title. The
possessor intends to appropriate and use
the land as his own, to the exclusion of
all others irrespective of any semblance
of title or legal right . . . A claim of
right need not be expressed.
It is sufficient that the acts of the party in
possession indicate a claim of ownership.
The actual occupation, use and improvement
of the premises, without payment of rent,
recognition of another's title or disavowal
of one's own title, raises a presumption
that the possessor entered and is holding
as absolute owner.
Id. at 735.
COOK and her deceased husband entered upon the
subject property in 1952 with the intention of using
it as their own land to the exclusion of all others.
They used and occupied it from that time forward
paying no rent to anyone else, recognizing no one
else's title to it, and claiming it as their own.
Their conduct certainly manifested a claim of title
sufficient for them to claim title by reason of
adverse possession.

-7-
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I
It is interesting to note that, even if Utah

1~

did require color of title as well as claim of title,
COOK has color of title on two grounds.

First, she has

her deed, which although inoperable to pass title because of the defect in THORNOCK' s deed, is operable to
give her color of title.

"Color of title is a writing

upon its face purporting to pass title, but in fact does
not".

Peterson v. Weber County, 99 Utah 281, 103 P. 2d

( 1940) .

law.

Secondly, she has color of title by operation c'

As stated at Utah Code (Repl. Vol. 6 A 1953). §57-!·
.any person has color of title who
has occupied a tract of real estate by
himself or by those under whom he claims,
for the term of 5 years.
. . . .
Should the court find COOK's claim to the

prop~ey

by reason of adverse possession valid, THORNOCK has no
right to the minerals.

This conclusion logically follC''3

from well-established rules of real property.

First, ar.

adverse possessor has absolute title to both surface and
sub-surface rights.

Second, where a quitclaim deed is

involved after-acquired title does not vest in the gra:ite:
Respondents challenge this on two separate bases.

First,

it is argued that once COOK acquired title by reason o'.
adverse possession, the doctrine of after-acquired titli
mandated that title passed immediately to Johnson, her

-8-
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immediate granter, and then from Johnson to THORNOCK,
by reason of the Johnson-Cook and Thornock-Johnson deeds.
This argument is based on the assertion that a "reservation" in a deed is a conveyance, so that in the JohnsonCook deed, COOK was actually the granter to THORNOCK of
the mineral rights.

This linguistic twist, acting to

transform the grantees into granters, would enable
application of the after-acquired property principle in
reverse.

In the case cited by Respondents (RB 20),

Burton v. United States, 29 Utah 226, 507 P. 2d 710
(1973), this court is quoted as stating:

The reservation creates a new right
issuing out of the property granted,
which did not exist as an independent
right before the grant.
Id. at p. 712 (emphasis added).
I t is a difficult jump from the phrase "new right issuing

out of the property granted" to reach the conclusion that
gra~tee

becomes granter for purposes of the reservation.

Furthermore, even if it were conceded that the reservation
is a granting back of property granted, it would seem only
logical that it would be necessary that property be validly
com·eyed initially.
§262 at p.

As stated at 23 Arn. Jur. 2d "Deeds"

297-8:

-9-
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. the terms 'reservation' and 'exception,
are quite conunonly used as interchanaeabl
terms . . . . The factor conunon to both ~n
e
exception and reservation is that each subtracts. or deducts from the thing granted
narrowing and limiting what would other-'
wise p~ss by the general words of grant.
Accordingly, either a reservation or an
exception in a deed, to be effective
must be of some right or interest ow~ed
by the granter in the land at the time
the deed was made. Also, regardless of
the nomenclature used by the grantor, the
meaning intended must be determined by
reference to the subject matter and the
surrounding circumstances.
(emphasis added) .
In the case at bar, appellants are alleging that
THORNOCK had a defective title and, therefore, had no
title to pass to Johnson, who in turn had no title
pass to COOK.

~

Arguably, the gr an tor for each deed ther.

had no right or interest to convey at the time the deed
was made, and therefore the reservation was inef:ective.
Phillips v. Johnson, 202 Okla. 645, 217 P. 2d 520
(1950)

involved a situation similar to the one in the

instant case.

Plaintiff in Phillips conveyed real

property to Grantee I with a reservation of mineral
rights in Plaintiff.

Grantee I conveyed to Grantee II

with the same reservation stated in their

conveyan~·

Grantee II them conveyed to Plaintiff with the same
reservation because he was under the misunderstanding
· ui'.'·

that the clause was necessary to preserve the contin

-10-
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·

of reservation in himself, and Grantee II so understood
the situation.

After Plaintiff became owner of the

property, Grantee II died, and his heirs did not even
try to establish that Grantee II could reserve the
~ineral

rights if he did not originally have them.
Defendant apparently concedes that a
reservation in a deed, to be effective,
must reserve some right or interest
owned or possessed by grantor in the
land at the time the deed was made,
~ince this rule is well established.
Id. at p. 646.

The court examined the circumstances and the parties'
intentions and determined that the mineral rights were
originally reserved in Plaintiff's name and, therefore,
since Grar.tee II never had them, she could not reserve
them.
Likewise, since neither Johnson nor THORNOCK ever
owned the mineral rights by fault of the defects in the
chain of title, they could not reserve them and so the
after-acquired property rule did not act to convey the
rights to them once they were acquired by COOK by virtue
of adverse possession.
Secondly, respondents argue that the established
principle that after-acquired title does not vest in the
grantee where a quitclaim deed is involved should not be

-11-
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applied to the instant situation.

Appellants agree that

there is an exception which is applicable in certain
situations.

As stated at 26 C.J.S. "Deeds" §118 at p. g;

An after acquired title may pass, however,
under special circumstances, as where a
person conveys by quitclaim deed and
covenants against a particular title
which he afterwards acquires.
(emphasis added).
The cases where the exception to the established principii
stated above is applied, involve situations where the
language of the quitclaim deed contains a convenant quit·
claiming all right and title in possession and expectancy
or contains covenants of further assurances.

The

cue~

by respondents as authority, McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind.

618, 82 N.E. 1057 (1907) itself contained a quitcla~~~
with such a covenant:
.the interest conveyed by said
Zachariah T. Lincoln is the equal,
undivided one-third part of two-thirds
of the same, and any other interest
which might accrue to said Zachariah T.
Lincoln after the death of said
Elizabeth, his mother.
Id.at p. 520 (emphasis added).
.
st •;hiC
On the basis of the language "and any other 1ntere
·
might accrue", the court held title in after-acquired p'.C:
erty passed to the grantee of the quitclaim deed when
by grantor.
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In the case at bar, the quitclaim deed from COOK
to THORNOCK contained no such covenant.
accord with Utah Code Ann.

Therefore, in

(Repl. Vol. 6 A 1953) §57-1-13,

the effect of the quitclaim deed was simply to convey COOK's
interest in the property at the date of the deed, and since
COOK's title by adverse possession had not yet ripened, COOK
has no interest to convey.
Therefore, if the court finds that COOK's claim of
adverse possession is valid, THORNOCK has no right to the
minerals under any theory.
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POINT

2

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT QUESTIONS OF FACT AS TO THE
VALIDITY OF THE QUITCLAIM DEED EXIST WHICH WARRANT A TRI.\:
ON THE MERITS.
Respondents contend that under Rule 56 (e), Utah Ruk

-----..:

of Civil Procedure, the assertions of COOK in her Second
Amended Answer and Counterclaim may not be considered by:
Court since they are legal conclusions.

In the subject

pleading, COOK denies that she ever executed the Quitclai:
Deed - this is a statement of fact based on personal knoi·
edge.

It is not a conclusion, not an opinion and not heo:

Additionally, in the subject pleading the issue is raisec
regarding the insertion by hand of the land
page 1 of the quitclaim deed.

descri~ioor

COOK denies knowledge oft'

insertion or the surrounding circumstances, and in fact,
she did not initial the insertion.

The fact of the inser·

tion as well as the fact of COOK' s lack of knowledge and
consent are not legal conclusions, not opinion and not
hearsay.

They raise factual issues affecting the validit;

of the quitclaim deed.
Even if the Court did not consider the allegatioM~
the Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, the balance c
the record shows sufficient issues of fact regarding the
· 1 on the
validity of the quitclaim deed to warrant a tr1a

merits.

This is amply argued in Appe 1 lant ' s Br1· ef
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i!t Po!'.

To briefly recapitulate, the deed on its face raises
questions:

namely, the above-mentioned after-inserted

land description, undated and uninitialled by COOK;
page 2, the signature page, contains only signatures
with no reference to page l; the qualitative differences
in stationery between pages 1 and 2.

Certainly these are

questions which cannot be resolved absent additional
evidence and the testimony of expert witnesses.

Further,

COOK's deposition raises triable issues of fact.

In it,

she states repeatedly that she has no recollection of
having executed a quitclaim deed.

She only recalls that

she signed a "paper", one executed solely because she
and her husband were continually "hounded" by THORNOCK.
Obviously, there are serious doubts as to the validity
of the quitclaim deed.
As this court

s~ated

in Durham v. Margetts, 571

P. 2 1332 (Utah 1977),:
The surrunary judgment procedure has the
desirable and salutary purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and expense of
a trial when there are no issues of fact
in dispute and the controversy can be
resolved as a matter of law. Nevertheless, that should not be done on conjecture, but only when the matter is clear;
and in case of doubt, the doubt should
be resolved in allowing the challenging
party the opportunity of at least attempting to prove his right to recover.
For
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that :::-eason, the." s1:1bmissions" [pleadings,
depositions, admissions and affidavits]
should be looked at in the light most
favorable to her position and unless the
court is able to conclude that there is
no dispute on material facts, which if r~
solved in her favor would entitle her to
recover, the court should not summarily
reject her claim and render judgment against
her as a matter of law.
Upon review we applz
the same standard as that applied by the
trial court.
Id. at p. 1334

(emphasis added).

Looked at in the light most favorable to COOK, the
submissions manifest questions of fact regarding the
validity of the quitclaim deed which could be resolved
in COOK' s favor, and which might thereby affect the judg·
ment.

Therefore, it would seem that summary judgment

should not have been given against her as a matter of
law.

-16-
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CONCLUSION

There are substantial questions of fact to be
resolved regarding the validity of the quitclaim deed.
If it is determined to be invalid, the mineral rights
in the subject property were not conveyed to THORNOCK.
Even if the quitclaim deed is held to be valid,
since COOK has title to the property by adverse possession, a title which had not ripened at the time the
quitclaim deed was executed, the mineral rights were
not conveyed to THORNOCK by the quitclaim deed.

The

determination of the validity of COOK's claim to title
by virtue of adverse possession necessitates the resolution of factual questions regarding the defect in
THORNOCK's title.
The existence of questions of fact as to the
validity of the quitclaim deed and the validity of
THORNOCK's title, warrant a trial on the merits.
For these reasons, appellant prays this honorable
court to set aside the summary judgment below, together
with the decree of quiet title, and to remand the entire
matter for a trial on the merits in the District Court.
DATED September 28, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
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